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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
,J < >II X D. G J_j y-K K, 
I) I a i Jl t i / f a nd ~ 1 1 J 1 J e II a Jl t, 
vs. 
~I~\ ItJ Ol~Il~ D()Cr_t.,OH~Il\X 
J)l'BIX, aka ~lr\H.J()RIE 
DOCrrOB~I .. \X and J>Ij:~ERET 
F.,EDJ1~B1\L ~ ... \\'"I XU~ .:\XD 
L< L\X 1\~SOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
lJcfeudants UJl(ll-lespondents. 
Case No. 9388 
BRIEF < >F DEFEXD.A_X'T-J~ESPOXDE~r_t., 
Lot :!-t, East ~I ill brook X o. :!, State of l T tah, \Yas 
arqnirf\d hy ~larjoriP Doctor1nan (then Dubin), herPin-
after ('alled thP Dt•fendant and Dr. ~[artin F. Dubin, in 
joint tenancy on .July :!:!, 1957. The do\vn pay1nent, in 
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exce~H of $10,500, ,,·as n1ade out of funds accuu1ulated 
by Defendant prior to 1narriage to Dubin. (Response X o. 
12, dated June 18, 1959, of Dr. ~lartin :B--,. Dubin to inter-
rogatories, in file X o. 119467 and findings of fart in file 
No. 123578.) 
Defendant :\[arjorie Doctor1nan sued in separate 
1naintenance against Dr. :\Jartin F. Dubin in cause K o. 
119467 in the Salt Lake County District Court in Decem-
her 1958, and recorded a lis pendens setting forth that 
:\Iarjorie Doctorrnan Dubin prayed for the property in 
dispute under clai1n of right. :\lore than three n1onth:-5 
later an a1aended co1nplaint in divorce on the grounds 
of rruelty \Yas filed setting forth ~larjorie Doctor1nan 
Dubin's principal outlay in the said property, her right 
to it, and re<1uesting the Court to a\\Tard her all of Dr. 
J[artin F. Dubin's right, title and intere~t in and to the 
sa1ne. 
Plaintiff in this action \Yas retained a.~ roun:sel for 
Dr. l\1 artin F. Dubin, entPred his appearance a8 such, and 
ans\\·ered the a1nended co1nplaint, also cro8s co1nplaining 
for a divorce . 
...:\ quit-rlaint deed \\·as dated and recorded Deceutber 
7, 1959, in Salt Lake County, \Yith Dr. :\lartin }"~. Dubin 
as grantor and John D. Ulynn as Grantee. (Exhibit Xo. 6) 
On trial a pro1nissor~· notP dated Decentber 7, 1959 (Ex-
hibit X o. ~) \rns pres en ted a~ partial consideration there-
for, on \rhich 1>a~·111Pnt~ hPgan tTanuary 7, 19GO. ( Tr l~g 40, 
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Ln -1-) 'The l'Plllaining ('on~1deration "\Yas perfor1ned l('gnl 
~(' rvicP~. cr 1' l)g 3;), l.~n~ u-1:2; rrr Pg -±1, Ins ~--~--~9.) 
... \fter ~ p.111. on Dece1nber 8, 1959, the Honorable 
~\. H. Ellett disrnissed rau~e No. 119-!67 on his o\\·n Ino-
tion \\·ithout prPjudice to tl!P rights of the parties and 
\\·ith leave to proceed in anotllt'l' action (Exhibit Xo. 1). 
Tlll' Court's reason "\Va~ that it lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the a1nended coulplaint in divorce related back 
to the date of original filing in separate 1naintenance and, 
therPfore, the three 1nonths l'(';..;ident requisite "\Ya~ not a 
faet. 
Prior, ho\\·ever, to the dis1nissal, ~Iarjorie Doctor1nan 
Dubin filed a ne\\. action in divorce (order to sho'v cause 
file X o. 1~3378, signed b~· ~\. li. Ellett, Judge at 1 :10 P.~l. 
Dec. S, 1959) against Dr. ~Iartin F. Dubin, specifically 
describing the property here involved, clairning her right 
thereto and praying for distribution to her of the interest 
therein of Dr . .Jiartin F. Dubin. Lis pendens "\Vas re-
corded at 1 :-!3 p.1n. (Exhibit No. 7). 
Plaintiff herein, John D. Glynn, kne"\v prior to the 
execution and deliYery to hiu1 of the December 7 deed 
that the do"\vn payn1ent for this property "\vas made by 
~Iarjorie Doctorrnan Dubin fro1n her separate estate 
acquired prior to 1narriage to Dr. ~lartin F. Dubin ('Tr. 
Pg. ;) 7, ln. 12: Tr. Pg. 38, In~. 10 and 18). He kne"\v that 
payrnent~ ",.ere n1ade on the property fro1n the ~Pparate 
funds of ~Iarjorie Doctor1nan Dubin; he kne\\. that cause~ 
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X o.i 119467 and 123578 \rere filed vraying distribution 
of the interest of the subject proverty to her ( Tr. Pg. 
50, Ins. 10 to botto1n of page; Exhibit X o. 9). 
All thi ~ Glynn kne\v prior to the execution and de-
livery of the deeds to him. 
A <1uit-claim deed dated Dece1nber 8, 1959, ,,·ith Dr. 
~Iartin F. Dubin a~ grantor and John D. Glynn a8 
(}rantee, conveying the ~ubject vroperty \\'"as recorded in 
Salt Lake County, at 4:40 p.1n. It states for infor1national 
purposes a promissory note in the sum of $5,000 payable 
in $100 monthly in~talln1ents \\·as delivered by the grantee 
to the grantor. Another docu1nent \\·as recorded purport-
ing to be for infor1national purposes setting forth the said 
note. The considerations for both deed~ \\'"ere the sa1ne, 
the second deed being 111ade because Glynn ~ ~,rasn't sure 
of the legality of the first doctnnent (Tr. Pg. 45, Ins. ·1-
bottoin of the page). The deed and note dated Dece1nber 
8, 1959, \\rere executed and delivered on the 1norning of 
Dece1nber 8, 1D39 (Tr. Pg. 46, ln. 21; Tr. Pg. 48~ ln. 10) 
\Vhirh ,,·a~ prior to the dis1nissal \\·ithout prejudice of 
cause No. 119467. 
_.~\ dPcree ,,·a~ u1ade and entered in cau~l) X o. 1233/S 
on J anuar~· :20, 1960, a~ folio\\·~: H Plaintiff be, and she 
hPreh~· i~~ a ,,·arded as her ~oll) and separate property, 
free and cll)ar of any elai1n~ of the Dt)fendant, the follo\\T-
ing dP~eribed propPrty located in Nalt Lake ( ~ounty, State 
of lTtah, to-\rit: I~ot 2-l-. Ea~t .:\1 illBrook X o. :2~ according 
to thP offieinl plat~ of ~alt Lake County.·~ 
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The (~ourt in the instant case granted Plaintiff's 
n1otion to dis1niss Plaintiff's con1plaint in partition and 
ordered judgn1ent entered thereon, and further decreed 
the quieting of cross con1plainant l\larjorie Doctoru1an '~ 
title in and to the subject property. 
POINTS OF LA \\r 
I. ALTHOUGH A COMPLAINT DOES NOT SET FORTH 
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS TO STATE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION UNDER 'THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STAT-
U'TE, THE COURT lVIAY 'TAI{E SUCH EVIDENCE AS MAY 
BE RELEVANT AND GRANT JUDGMENT THEREON. 
II. IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE WHERE CERTAIN 
PROPERTIES ARE SPECIFICALLY NAMED IN THE COM-
PLAINT AND TITLE THERETO SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT 
BY EITHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE ACTION, 
THEN THE SAID PROPERTY IS WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF 'THE COURT, SUBJECT TO ITS ORDER AND 
FREE FROM ANY PERSON CLAIMING THEREAFTER, 
OTHER THAN A BONAFIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE; THAT 
IS, ONE TAKING INNOCENTLY WITHOUT NO'TICE OF 
THE ADVERSE CLAIM, AND PAYING AN ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATION. 
III. LIS PENDENS GIVES NOTICE TO ALL THE 
WORLD OF CLAIM IN THE PROPER'TY NAlVIED, AND ANY 
PERSON TAKING SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECORDING OF 
LIS PENDENS ·TAKES SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THE 
P AR'TIES AS DETERMINED BY DECREE IN THE ACTION 
NAMED. 
THE EFFECT OF LIS PENDENS TO OPERATE AS 
SUCH NOTICE EXTENDS BEYOND THE DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF AN ACTION AND CONTINUES 
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AS NO·TICE TO ALL PARTIES TO AND THROUGH A SUB-
SEQUENT ACTION BROUGHT TO DETERl\IINE THE 
MERITS OF THE ORIGINAL CAUSE. 
ARG l,..JIEK'r 
I. ALTHOUGH A COMPLAINT DOES NOT SET FORTH 
ALL OF THE ALLEGATIONS TO STATE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION UNDER ·THE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STAT-
U'TE, THE COURT l\1AY 'TAKE SUCH EVIDENCE AS l\'IAY 
BE RELEVANT AND GRANT JUDGMENT THEREON. 
Rule 15 (b) of lTtah Rule~ of Civil I>rocedure, 
A1nendn1ents to Confor1n to the Evidence. - \\11Pn i~:-;ues 
not raised b~~ the pleadings are tried by express or inl-
plied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects a~ if they· had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
ainendment of the pleadings as 1nay be nect}~sar~~ to 
causP then1 to confor1n to the evidence and to raise tht·se 
issues 1nay be n1ade upon 1notion of any party at any 
tin1P, even after judg1nent; but failure so to a1nend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
\Yhile l~espondent belieYe~ it has established a cause 
undPr the fraudulPnt convPyance ~tatute, it is not our 
purpose to be liu1ited to ~eeking relief through its uledi-
tun. 
It is not essential that respondent establish that 
Dr. Dubin delivered this deed 'Yith the fraudulent intent 
to dPprive his "'"if<' of her right:-;, hut rather to establish 
that 0-l)'"nn "·n:-; not fre(\ of tht\ :-;u:-;pieion that Dr. Dnhin 
aeted \Yith such a n1otivntion. 
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II. IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE WHERE CERT.AlN 
PROPERTIES ARE SPECIFICALLY NAMED IN THE COlVI-
PLAINT AND TITLE TI-IERETO SPECIFICALLY SOUGHT 
BY EITHER OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES IN THE ACTION, 
THEN TilE SAID PROPERTY IS WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF 'THE COURT, SUBJECT TO ITS ORDER AND 
FREE FROM ANY PERSON CLAIMING THEREAFTER, 
OTHER THAN A BONAFIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE; THAT 
IS, ONE TAKING INNOCENTLY WITHOUT NO'TICE OF 
TilE ADVERSE CLAIM, AND PAYING AN ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATIO·N. 
Runtsey c. R111nsey (l~ansas), 90 Pac. (2) 1093 is a 
case aptly in point. The \vjfe sued husband for divorce 
on July 30, 1937, and the husband and J. R. Harris to set 
aside a deed. Incidental to and at the same time, the 
Plaintiff levied an attaclnnent on the said land. Investor's 
Royalty Co., a grantee of ,J. R. Harris, intervened. 
The \vife's co1nplaint alleged the husband to be the 
O\vner of certain land and petitioned that it be set aside 
to her a.s alimony . 
...._.:\_ supple1nental petition alleging that after the com-
Inenceinent of the action n1ineral deeds conveying the 
subject land to Harris \Yere recorded and this was a 
scheinl~ to defraud Plaintiff of her interests. 
The intervenor clain1ed the transfer to Harris on 
July 19 and to the1n August 3, 1937. On trial the inter-
venor::-; testified paying $2750 and \Yere a\Yare of the 
status of the record ( attacl11nent and divorce file for 
alimony.) 
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The Court stated: HThe record \Vas certainly suffi-
cient to put an ordinarily prudent person upon inquir~r. 
l"""nder the fact~ shovvn by the record it \vould be diffieult 
for intervenor to ~ustain it~ eontention that it "·as an in-
nocent purchaser for value ,,·ithout notice. But it i~ not 
necessary to deterrnine the claiins of the intervenor on 
these equitable grounds alone; any right title or interest 
no\v asserted h~· intervenor \Va~ acquired \vhile the ali-
rnony suit \va~ pending and undeter1nined." 
Even 1norP succint]y the Court in WHken.soJl c. Elliot 
43 l{an. 590, :2::3 Pac. Gl-±: '" \ Yhere the \vife files a petition 
asking for divorce and ali1nony in ,,·hich ~hl~ definitely 
deseribed real estate of husband and prays it be set 
apart and decreed hers as per1nanent ali1nony, the doc-
trine of lis p~endens ,,·ill apply; any one \vho purcha~e~ 
such property during pendency of the action \vill be 
bound hy the judg1nent subsequently tendered therein. 
'" L'" nder thP lis pendens statute the interYenor \vas 
charged \vith constructiYe notice of the rights of plaintiff; 
frorn the record it is clear it also had actual notice. It 
cannot no\\. co1nplain. ,, 
The t"·o cases eited ahoYl1 deal \vith the proble1n of 
specific propert~· \vhere the co1nplaints haYe requested 
that thP properties bP sPt aside as ali1nony. 
TltP subjeet ease and the follo"'"ing easPs deal speei-
l'ieall~· ,,·here Plaintiffs haYP specified the land, clai1ning 
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the111 not lltPrel~· H:-\ per1nanent aliu1ony but al~o under 
claillt of right. 
I 1/ r / / • ' > ' > I.J fl] - I,_) ' ) 1 ,...., 0 '- T 11, 1 ~ ( ' f F . n . o o r c u. ; .J (' 1 c ~ •). F, . . • ) \ ~ o_) , ..... , ~ u > -t, ann 1 e 
.Zelie ~<·oda and Louis ~eoda took eertain property as 
joint tenants in 19Ui. On .. \ ugust 1~, 19~7, Fannie filed 
for divor<'P desc-ribing th<· :-\Hid propert~· and alleging she 
had furni:-\hed thP pureha~<· price. ~he prayed that Scoda 
be n:qui red to eonve~r thP :-\aid propert~· to her and for 
an injunetion rPst raining hint fron1 encuu1bering and 
di:-\posing the satnP. The suunnons and the injunction 
\Vere not servl·d upon ~eoda until _..\ugust 30, 19~7. On 
.. \ ugust ~0 the a ppellan fs~ ( ,,·ho like U lynn here, \Yer<· 
counsel for ~coda in the divor<·e proceeding:-\) took judg-
Inent h~· <·onf'L•:-\:-\ion against Scoda and levied Pxeeution 
on ~<'oda~s share of the propert~·. On the ~hPriff's salP~ 
thP ap1>ellant~ bought for their judg1nent. 
_..\ t trial the court held that Fannie had furnished 
the pureluu.;e price and ordered Scoda to convp~· all of 
hi:-\ right, title, and intere:-\t in lieu of ali1nony and in tl1<• 
alternativP, hi:-\ lltastL·r in ehancery should 1nake the con-
veyance. ()n ~Ia~· :>, l~)~S, Fannie convp~·ed an undivided 
1/:20 of the said property to .Jl ar~· .JI oore \Yho on the 31~t 
of .Jfay, 1 ~):2~. filPd a :-\Uit for partition. ...-\ ppellants an-
:-\\\·ered adutitting having notice of the filing of the bill 
for divor<·P. (In Illinoi:-\, by :-\tatutt\ the filing of a bill 
of ron1plaint opera tPs to givP ron:-\trnctivo notiee of the 
:'Uhjeet :'tated therein.) The (iourt deelared a~ folio\\·:-\: 
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~'It appears on taking te~tunony in thi~ action 
chancellor found Fannie had paid 1none~~ and 
he concluded a resulting trust arose for benefit 
of "Tife-not\Yithstanding the rights and interests 
of the parti(•s to this property had been disposed 
of in the divorce decree \\·hich \Ya~ res adjudicata 
as to all ( 1uestions raised in that proceeding. 
"The principal question for revie\v herP is 
\vhether the judgment for appellants secured ... \ug-
ust 20, 1927, v. Loui~ Scoda \Yas lis pendens the 
divorce proceedings-if it \Yas the a1H·llant here 
are \Yithout title or interests and the circuit court 
in the partition proceedings \Yas right in so de-
creeing.'' 
Fler suit .L-\ugust 1:2. 
Judg1nent August :20. 
Service August 30. 
'~Under that statute (lis pendens) fron1 the 
date of filing of bill appellants and all others 
had notice of pendency of the suit in equity affect-
ing this real estate, and \\'"hateyer rights appellants 
sought \\'Pre 1nade snl>jt1 et to the decree of tl1e 
eourt in that ease. _._\ ppellants did not interYene 
therein, although the record sho\\~s they filed no-
tice of a 1notion to set aside the default against 
Lous Seoda but apparently abandoned it.~, 
The decree of tlu· circuit court in the diYoree pro-
ceeding i~ l'l'~ adjudicata of the right of FanniP Zelie to 
the entire propPrt~~. 
Appellant eitP~ Sun Jo.-ntrance C'on1pany r. Trhite, 
1:2:~ l 1 19G, 3:-l Pae 90:2. I~espondent cites the sallll' easl' 
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1n ~upport of ltis prin('ipal ('Ollt(•ntion and di~tingui~he~ 
it fron1 tlH· ('<l~t· at har on tlH· follo\\·ing grounds. !)lain-
tiff ~UP<l her husband for a divor(·e enuntl·rating par('el~ 
of eouununity prOIH·rty in hl}r contplaint. ~rhe subjl·('t 
property lH·rt· ,,·as irH·ludl}d in the enu1neration. The 
trial court found the subjl·<·t propPrty not to be coinmun-
ity property but the private (•state of the husband. The 
eourt dec n_•vd all of the eonnnunity propl}rty to the \\·ife 
\rith leaVl' to fill• for a supplentental decree as hl}r needs 
ntay detPrlninP. ~un In~uranee Contpany, although a\rare 
of the status of this divor<·P procevding at all tintes, in-
cluding kno\vledge of an ordPr to the effeet that the hus-
band ~hould not alienate or PlH'Ulnber exeept in the ordin-
ar~· pursuit~ of hi~ business, loaned 1noney on the said 
l)l'Ol>PrtY and took a Inorto·ao·p \\·hich theY atte1npted ulti-. b b • 
1nately to forerlosl'. The suit here involves the deterntina-
tion of lien priority, either the \\·i fe's or the insurance 
co1npany'~. 
Thl} court holding \Ya~ to the effect that a po\\·er to 
entPr supple1nental dp(•ree for ali1nony is not ~ueh a~ to 
con~titutP a lien on all of the property of a hu~band, 
and in snhstance her right~ against the property are no 
better than those of a general creditor. Further, it ~ta t('d 
approvingly as follows: 
H :\lr. Freen1an, al~o, in his treatise on J udg-
Inent~ (~ertion 19G), after ~tating that the dortrinP 
of li~ pendens i~ applirahlP only "·hen the ohjPc-t 
of tlH· aetion i~ to affPet ~pc·eifie propert.v·, and 
that the rulP~ pertaining thPrto havP no applica-
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tion in a suit for divorce and ali1nony, unle~~ the 
wife designates in her co1nplaint cPrtain specific 
property \vhich she seeks to subject to her claim, 
says : 'If the pleadings in a suit for divorce de-
scribe specific property, in resp(jct to \\'hich relief 
i~ sought, either by 1naking it chargeable \\'ith the 
payment of alimony, or setting it apart for the 
use of, or as the property of, one of the partie~, 
or of partitioning or dividing it bet\Yeen the1n, 
the doctrines of lis pendens apply,' - citing in 
support thereof some of the sa1ne authorities. But 
the decisions in the cases cited by the appellant, 
as well as those cited by .Jlr. Freeinan in support 
of his statement, 'vill be found, upon exa1nination, 
to have been Inade either by virtue of so1ne statu-
tory provision, or upon the peculiar circun1stances 
of the case before the court. In so1ne of the cases 
the decision \Yas rendered upon the ground that 
the complaint alleged that the property therein 
described constituted all the property out of \Yhich 
alimony could be recovered.'' 
It proceeds further to cite a ~eries of case~ colnplete-
1~, and conclusive!~, supporting thP contPntion of the re-
spondent here. 
Leu·is r. Le1cP,-..·, 210 Ga. 330, 80 SE :2nd 31:2 cited by 
the a1>pellant also \\'e feel supports the respondenf8 case. 
In this case the trial eourt nonsni ted the diYorced \Yife in 
an action brought to cancel a deed frou1 her for1ner hus-
band to his attorney of a house and lot \Yhich had been 
a\\·arded to her and hPr childrPn in the diYorce proceed-
1ngs. 
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()n appPal this nonsuit \ras held to be Pl'ror 
•• \rhen• it H!JlH'Hl'<'d that the propert:r had been 
trnnsi'Prred to the attorneY prior to tlu· brino·ino· 
. b ;-. 
of the diYOl'('(' a('tion, out at a ti1ne \\·hen t}H• par-
t i c•s \VP I'P sppa r<-lt Pd, the• agTPt•d <·on s i <lP ration hP-
ing $500 as a f<·e for serYiees 1>:· the attorne:· in 
brino·ino· a divoi'<'P action ao·ainst the \\'ife and ;-. b . h ' ' 
a l>UrehasP-InonPY notP of $700 too·(·ther \\·ith the· 
. ' ,......., 
asstunption of a loan against the property. TlH· 
appellate court not(•d that the attorne:· had nevPr 
SPPn tl1P propPrty· but aeePptPd the value of the 
husband's Pquit:· in it on infor1nation given hin1 
b:· the husband, and also knP\\. that the property 
\ras oceupied h:· the \vife and her children, and 
held that \vhetlH·r kno\vlPdgt• of thPse facts \\·as 
suffieient to raisP a rPasona ble suspicion in tlu· 
attorne:·'s 111ind that the husband's ohjt>et \\·as to 
defeat the \vife 's possi bh· clain1 for alillH>n:· should 
haYe he<'n subn1ittPd to thP ,jur:r. The court point-
ed out that evPn though the deed \ras 1nade upon 
a valuahlP consideration, if the grantee had knowl-
edge that it \\'as Blade u:· t}H• husband \\·ith the 
intent to defraud his \rife, the jur:· \Vould bP au-
thorized to canePl the deed.'' 
1~/iies l'. Thies, 111 Xeh. 805,198 X\\T 131, citc·d by 
the appellant is distinguishable fro1n the ea~e before thi~~ 
court largel~· on the scuue theor:· as that of the Sun In-
surance <·asP. In the r_rhiPs ease, an attorney took a 
Blorto·ao·e on a eertain I)iece of land, ,,·hile the divoree h h 
action \\·as pending against thP hus hand. The \\·ife did 
not join in thP 1nortgnge nor did she spPcify in the coin-
plaint thP sPtting aside to he·r of the subject land either 
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as ~pecified alimony or under other per~onal clain1. The 
<1uestion involved \\'as \vhether the 1nortgage \Va~ to pre-
vail against a later rlairn for ali1nony and attorney's fees. 
Appellant 1nakes further point on his behalf of Ad-
anzson v. Adan1sou, 55 Utah 3-1--t, 188 J)ac. 635. Respond-
ent feels this case should properly be cited for the re-
spondent. 
In this case several divorce proceedings had been 
started by either the husband or the \vife in the period 
between 1909 and 1916. In ~larch 191G, they O\\'Iled a 
parcel of land valued at $2500. The parties \vere sepa-
rated and the husband had been trying for so1netin1e to 
sell this parcel of property. The \vife consistently re-
fused to join in any conveyance \vith the husband. He 
finally sold his one-half to his father for $1:250, ackno\rl-
edged to be a fair value for the one-half of the land, on 
terrns of $250 do\vn, $500 before the end of the year. and 
the final $500 the follo\\Ting year. In 1917 this action in 
divorce and to set aside the eonYeyance to the father \Ya~ 
instituted. 
The plaintiff \\"rife rontended the conveyance "Tas 
1nade to defraud her of her intPre~t. The court, in sus-
taining the right~ of the father, declared as folio\\~~: 
"The testilnony in thi~ ea~e ~trangely tend~ 
to sho\\r defendant~ .1\<lan1~on ~Pnior~ purcha~ed 
the propPrt~· in good faith~ and the tP~tinlony i~ 
quite conclu~ive that he paid for it all that it "-a~ 
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~talhnent i~ not <·onclu~iYP of fraud. ~\ t hP~t it only 
rai~P~ a pr(l~Ulllption.'' 
III. LIS PENDENS GIVES NOTICE TO ALL TJ:-IE 
\VORLD OF CLAil\I IN THE PROPER·TY NAMED, AND ANY 
PERSON TAKING SUBSEQUEl\TT TO THE RECORDING OF 
LIS PENDENS TAKES SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES AS DETERMINED BY DECREE IN THE ACTION 
NAMED. 
THE EFFECT OF LIS PENDENS TO OPERATE AS 
SUCH NOTICE EXTENDS BEYOND THE DISMISSAL 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF AN ACTION AND CONTINUES 
AS NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES TO AND THROUGH A SUB-
SEQUENT ACTION BROUGHT TO DETERMINE THE 
l\IERITS OF THE ORIGINAL CAUSE. 
ThP fir~t ~entl1 IH't 1 i~ ~o univer~all~· aeee1)tPd a:--; 
la\\· it rt•quires no furtlu·r ~upport. The pffeet of a lis 
pendens a~ adapted to the ca~P at bar is exhaustably di~­
t·u~~ed in Goorf . ..,·on eta! r. l.JeluHau, (N.(;.) 35 SE:2cl G:2:~, 
16;) .:\LR. Z>lO. ln the (; oo<l~on action thtl plaintiff brought 
~nit in July 19-!3 and reeonled a lis pPndc·ns .... \t thP tiinP 
of trial dPf'Pndant~ de1nurred and Inoved for a nonsuit. 
·rhe court overruled both and ulti1natel~· found for plain-
tiff~ on the i~~UP~. Defendants appealed and \Vere su~­
tainecl on the appeal. 11 he appPllate opinion \Ya~ certified 
to the trial court on or about DeePinber 3, 19-l-±. Th(l 
judginPnt 'va~ Pntered J anuar~· 1 ;), 194-5. On DeceinlH_•r 
19-!-J., the defendant~ in the fir~t aeti on, holding h~· Yi rtue 
of the contP~ted deed, eonYeyecl to the dPfPndant~ in this 
action. 
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On January 13, 1945, the plaintiff~ in the foruHlr 
proceedings brought a ne\Y action on the sa1ne cause seek-
ing the same relief, alleging additionall~, that the defend-
ants personally kne\Y all of the facts and also \Yertl pur-
chas\\'er~ pendente lite on the old lis pendens. The de-
fendant~ in the second action den1urred contending that 
it appears on the face of the pleading that at the ti1ne 
they took title the lis pendens \Yas in force since a judg-
Inen t of reversal \\'as final, ending the cause and the 
effectiveness of the notice of lis pendens, thereby giving 
the1n the status of an innocent purchaser \\~ithout notict~. 
The court gives two pages of reasons sustaining the 
effertiveness of the lis pendens recorded in the fir~t ac-
tion through the second cause but signifieantly adds the 
following: 
"'Et1ually derisiYP on the point, ho\vever, i~ thl1 
circu1nstance to \\'hich appellant~ ~ee111 to be in-
advertent. It is that plaintiffs haYe not relied 
solely on the original notice of li~ pendens, al-
though they they haYP pleaded it but haYe alleged 
that defendants had actual kno\\Tledge of plaintiff~ 
rights and equitieH in the land at thP ti1ne they 
acquired title." 
COXCLlTSIOX 
Defendant-cro~s con1plainant i~ justifiably entitled 
to thP relief granted hy the court. In the light of Judge 
\Tan ( 1otfs ohserYntions \\'ith respl)ct to appellant, it is 
eharit~, to :say no 1nore about appellant·~ good faith. 
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\\'"e fp(•l thP pffp(·t~ ol' li~ lH'lHh·n~ togethPr "?ith, or 
apart fl'Olll thP fatt of' !>Pl'~Oll~d knO\VlPdg'P in thl• appel-
lant~ thP f'aet of the pro1H·rt~· hPing in the juri~dietion 
01' tltP (•ourt at all tilllP~ involVPd: and the signifieant 
prin(·ipll• of l'P~ adjudieata of the clai1n~ of thP appellant 
a~ sPttlPd in the ~eeond divorc(• aetion, arP COlllpelling of 
no ot hP r eone 1 u~ ion than that of ~u~ta in i ng tllP trial eourt. 
If, ho\\·Pv(•r, tlH· court ~hould ~eP fit to rever~e dPei~ion 
of trial courC it is ~uln11itted that thi~ cau~P 1nu~t be 
ren1a1HlPd for further trial in that the Defendant-c-ross 
co1nplainant ha~ hot .'·et had the opportunity to prl•sent 
a defPn~P to plaintifr~ aetion in \\·hieh the llonorable 
~\. 1-I. EllPtt is a \\?i tnP~s to tP~ti f.'? l·~~Pntially to the sub-
stance of the que~tion propounded to plaintiff U l.'?nn h.'? 
J[r. DPan 'Conder on tran~eript pagP ;)-t, lines 7-10. 
Respectfull.'· subn1itted, 
Bl~RX 4\RD L. ROSE 
DE .. \X E. CO~DER 
.AJtoruey.-.,· for Respondent 
53 E. -l-th ~outh 
Salt l_.~ake City, l ... tah 
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